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《2015年日本軍力評估報告》英文版(全文)
http://www.CRNTT.tw   2016-08-15 00:24:16
 
 Chapter VIII Military and Security Exchange and Cooperation with Other Countries

 In 2015, Japan’s military and security cooperation has two tendencies:further fostering Japan-US alliance through revising Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation; bolsteringmilitary cooperation between Japan and its Asia-Pacific “para-allies” and its key partner through assisting the US with its engagement in South China Sea.

 A.ﻩFurther fostering Japan-US alliance.

 a.Revising Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation

 Unlike the previous revisions, in which the US played the leading role, Japan took the initiative and had been proactive from the beginning in this round of revision. One of the Japan’s goals was to realize JSDF’s role of “offering worldwide support to US forces” as a major military power through adapting to the US strategic demand against the backdrop of promoting collective self-defense. The specific goals include:

 1)Further defining the responsibilities and tasks each country should assume so as to enhancethe capabilities of cooperation and inter operability. The Guidelines emphasized that the future Japan-US defense cooperation should reach as far as the following:seamless, powerful, flexible and effective Japan-US collaborative engagement; worldwide cooperation tendencies of Japan-US alliance; cooperation with other regional partners; coordinated effect of national security policies of the US and Japanese governments; the alliance mechanism of government integration. As such, the Guidelines put forward the roles and tasks of the US and Japan, the general framework of cooperation and coordination and the orientation of policies.

 2) Consolidating seamless cooperation, expanding Japan-US alliance and elevating the roles Japan played in order to seek a mightier military power. The Guidelines listed the measures of the Japan-US cooperation:intelligence collecting; warning and surveillance and reconnaissance; training and exercises; sharing facilities and regions; rear backup; defense of resources (equipment etc.); air defense and anti-missile; defense of facilities and regions; search and rescue; evacuation of non-combatants; coping with refugees; maritime security guarantee and so on.

 3) Expanding engagement in regional and global security affairs. The Guidelines ascertained the promotion of trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation between Japan and the US and those partners inside and outside the region. The scope of cooperation included:peace-keeping operations; international humanitarian relief and disaster rescue; maritime security guarantee; supporting partners’ capability buildup; intelligence gathering; warning and surveillance and reconnaissance; rear backup and evacuation of non-combatants.

 4) Planning to meet challenging coming from the new fields. In view of the increasing risks of the breach of free availability and access to the space and cyber, Japan and the US reach a consensus on coping with these new subjects of security and guarantee seamlessly and effectively so as to promote space and cyber stability and security. Both sides agreed that JSDF and the US forces were in need of improvement for the purpose of completing these tasks and tackling cyber security which was of fundamental significance and that cooperation between the two governments should be bolstered so as to ensure space and cyber security and stability and to improve the survivability and recovery of the space system.

 b. Further enhancing military cooperation of the Japan-US alliance.

 According to the new Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation and the new security defense bills, the US and Japan set out to establish new mechanism of deepening cooperation of the alliance. In October, Japan held the triennial JMSDF maritime “fleet review”, inviting 18 countries including the US and India. In order to stress Japan-US alliance and promote cooperation, Mr. Abe embarked on “Reagan” nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in October, making himself the first incumbent Prime Minister on board. In November Defense Ministers of the US and Japan held talks, set about the “alliance coordination mechanism” , a new consultation mechanism, which could carry out unified transfer of the JSDF and the US forces at peacetime.

 (As such, there were corresponding consultation mechanism between the US and Japanese governments, the Defense Ministers and the JSDF and the US forces.) Japan held that, according to the Treaty of Security between the US and Japan, if no armed attacks were identified in the grey situations, defense of Japan would not fall within the range of the US obligations. So, if the alliance coordination mechanism could function at peacetime, Japan and the US would have seamless consultation and cooperation even in situations of “grey area”, for example, laying out joint plans and measures to cope with the unpredictable matters emerging at the Diaoyu Islands.

 In addition, Japan and the US further expanded the scope of the engagement of their alliance, especially started consolidating their cooperation at the South China Sea. Since 2015, the US military influential officers have continuously expressed welcome to the JSDF for their participation in the maritime and aerial patrol in the South China Sea. For example, from January, Admiral Thomas, commander of the US 7 Fleet, has expressed repeatedly that US applauded Japan’s decision to expand its aerial patrol area to the South China Sea. In February, Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani remarked at a press conference that Japan would discuss the issue and claimed that the range of the JSDF warning and surveillance was not geographically confined and that the policy not to send patrol fighters to the South China Sea needed reevaluation. In March, David Shear, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, announced that Japan and the US would strengthen the capability buildup and coordination in the South China Sea. In early April, the new US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter held talks with his Japanese counterpart in Japan, the first stop of his first Asia-Pacific visit. The two sides warned against regional militarization resulting from sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, revealing both sides’ intention to enhance cooperation for the US strategic rebalance. At the end of April, Japan and the US exchanged views at the “2+2” meeting on the situation in the South China Sea. According to Japan’s Defense Minister, “(the situation) is directly related to regional peace and prosperity and is the common concern for the US and Japan.”

 Later, the 1 article of the joint communiqué released after the meeting between US president and Japanese prime minister stated that “any activity aimed to change the status quo by the use of force poses challenges to the existing international system.” In May, at a congressional hearing, Prime Minister Abe did not deny the fact that the South China Sea fell within the range of “situations of significance” when JSDF is allowed to provide support for the US forces. In June, Commander of the US Pacific Command, Admiral Harry Harris, welcomed the JMSDF participation in patrolling the South China Sea. In July, highest ranking officers from the two countries, namely, Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano, Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff of JSDF,and General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff of the US armed forces, held bilateral strategic talks, discussing the JSDF activities in the South China Sea. In November, during his talks with Mr. Obama held at Manila, Mr. Abe announced Japan would support the US Freedom of Navigation Operation according to which US sends its warships to the South China Sea.

 B. Fostering defense and security cooperation with para-allies and partners

 a. Security and Defense cooperation with the countries of South East Asia

 Apart from frequent military exercises with the countries of South East Asia, JSDF sought to bolster bilateral military cooperation through helping the foreign forces to improve capability. This project named “capability buildup assistance”, which was formally carried out in 2012, was included in the National Security Strategy and the new National Defense Programme Guidelines by the Abe administration. Up to 2015, the JSDF has provided aid to as many as 9 countries, mostly South East Asian countries related to the South China Sea. Japan was stepping up its efforts to return to the South China Sea 70 years after it was expelled out of it. In May, at the “Asia Security Summit” (Shangri-la Dialogue), Japan’s Defense Minister said that it was pivotal
to improve the capabilities of warning and surveillance of ASEAN countries for the purpose of protecting regional waters. At the same time, officials of the Japanese Defense Ministry has started to hold talks on joint manufacturing of weapons with Malaysia and Indonesia. After Japan and the Philippines signed the agreement on security cooperation and providing equipment, in April, the Philippine Transportation Ministry and the Japanese Maritime Joint Company signed a contract of customizing 10 patrolling ships, which were to be delivered to the Philippines from 2016 to 2018. The patrolling ships cost PHP 8.808 billion, of which PHP 7.374 billion came from Japan’s ODA loans, and the rest PHP 1.434 billion was on the Philippines. And Japan was about to provide fund for the transformation of the fundamental facilities of a military base at the Philippine Palawan Island. Besides, Japan provided Vietnam with assistance, offering 6 old patrolling ships and some corresponding training advice for submarine personnel.

 Japan held frequent defense talks or military security forum with ASEAN countries aimed at reaching agreements on maritime security, aerial rules and regional security orders. For example, in January, Japan’s Defense Minister Gen Nakatani held talks with the visiting Philippine Defense Minister Gazmin. At the talks they reached an agreement on further enhancing maritime security cooperation and signed a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchange. In April, when visiting Da Nang with JS Kirisame (DD-104) and JS Asayuki (DD-132), the Commander of Escort Division 12, Captain Masaharu Sugimoto announced that “South China Sea was also of great significance to Japan”, stressing the necessity of enhancing cooperation between the JMSDF and the Vietnamese navy. In May, in his address delivered at the Asia Security Summit hosted by Singapore, the Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani put forward that ASEAN countries enhance the surveillance over the South China Sea and appealed to all the parties concerned for cooperation to lay down common rules to ensure free and safe flight and sailing in the area. In September, the 7th Japan-ASEAN defense-ministerial talks, which were held in Japan, also
addressed the issue of the South China Sea. In November, the Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani held talks with his Vietnamese counterpart Phung Quang Thanh in Hanoi, reaching an agreement on permitting the JMSDF ships to stop at the Vietnamese naval base of Cam Ranh Bay.

 In December, Japan and Indonesia held their first “2+2” talk on cooperation in the South ChinaSea.

 b.Security and defense cooperation with NATO and Australia, India and South Korea

 In order to further promote foreign military security cooperation, an organic part of “Abe’sNational Defense”, Japan went on with expanding security cooperation with the main memberstates of NATO, enhancing defense cooperation with Australia and India in the India-Asian areaand seeking to resume high-level liaison and negotiations with South Korea. In January, Japan andBritain held the first “two plus two” negotiations, discussing issues of accelerating joint researchof missile technology and reaching the “Accords of Communication of Services and Articles” (ACSA). In February, a captain-level officer from the British navy was sent to the headquarters ofthe JMSDF as British navy liaison officer. This was the first time that Japan accepted a liaison officer from foreign militaries other than the US, indicating close cooperation between Japan and Britain. In March, in the “2+2” negotiations held in Tokyo between Japan and France, the two sides signed the accord of defense equipment and released a statement on the dispute of the South China Sea. Also in March, Prime Minister Abe and his visiting Portuguese counterpart held talks and reached a consensus as to JSDF’s participation as an observer in the maritime training of NATO.

 In March, in the talks held in Tokyo between Japan’s Defense Minister and his Indian counterpart Manohar Parrikar, the issue of exporting to India US-2 relief airship was discussed.

 The two sides also agreed to enhance cooperation in maritime security and that JMSDF will continue to take part in the maritime joint drills held by the US and India. Mr. Parrikar later headed for Yokosuka to visit the largest JMSDF helicopter destroyer Izumo (DDH-183) which was commissioned into service in March. In December, Mr. Abe visited India and both sides came to a series of cooperation agreements, signed two accords of Japan’s transfer of its defense equipment and technology to India and of sharing classified intelligence in defense, and acknowledged to enhance security cooperation. According to the accords, India was about to purchase JMSDF U-2 amphibious aircraft, which was very likely to be the first transfer of large military equipment to foreign countries since the Japanese government passed “Three Principles for the Transfer of Defense Equipment”.

 In October, after an interval of over 4years, Japan’s Defense Minister visited ROK to enhance Japan-ROK and Japan-US-ROK defense cooperation to tackle regional security issues including the North Korean nuclear crisis.

 In November, in the “2+2” negotiations held between Japan and Australia in Sydney, a consensus was reached for the two sides to work out policies for cooperation in the Pacific, which was viewed by Yomiuri Shimbun as aiming at China’s further maritime activities. In December, Mr. Abe held talks with visiting Australian Prime Minister and both sides agreed to work out a new pact including joint training. Meanwhile, the two countries held intensive talks on Japan’s export of submarines to Australia.
 


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