Chapter II Military Strength
According to the statistics of both FY 2015 and FY 2016 budget plans released by Japanese Ministry of Defense website, by the end of the 2015, the JSDF has an authorized strength of 255,229 personnel （including 8,075 ready reserve personnel）. Among them, The JGSDF has an authorized strength of 150,863 personnel with an effective strength of 139,853； the JMSDF has an authorized strength of 45,364 personnel with an effective strength of 42,015； the JASDF has an authorized strength of 46,940 personnel with an effective strength of 43,259； the Combined Task Force has an authorized strength of 1,253 personnel, and the authorized number of personnel of the Joint Staff and the Intelligence Headquarters is respectively 368 and 1,911. In October, 2015, the newly established Defense Equipment Department integrated the Equipment and Facility Headquarters of the Defense Department and the Equipment Procurement Sectors of the JGSDF, JMSDF and JASDF, and the authorized number of personnel is 407 （the expected number is
1,800）. The establishment of the Reserve is 47,900.
In 2015, certain element of Japan’s military strength development remains unchanged. According to the principles, orientation and objectives of the enhancement of Japan’s defense strength outlined in the National Defense Strategy, the new National Defense Programme Guidelines and the new Mid-term Defense Programme, the Abe Administration continued with its all-rounded buildup of military strength, that is, striving to construct a highly-efficient joint defense force and a flexible, rapid-response joint operation system, to build a joint response system to seamlessly respond to a wide range of scenarios from armed attacks to large-scale natural disasters； to fully ensure both the quality and quantity of Japan’s defense force and to improve deterrence and responsiveness so as to construct a “joint mobile defense force” that is rapid, flexible, tenacious, and interconnected； to attach much importance to capabilities of warning and surveillance, intelligence, power projection, command and control, communications as well as to capabilities to respond to island invasion, ballistic missile attacks, space and cyber threats, massive catastrophes and participating in international peace co-operations； to give priority to the development of the capabilities to ensure maritime and air supremacy and to put importance to the improvement of the capability of rapid deployment in order to strengthen defense posture in the southwestern areas. The enhancement of the military strength of 2015 focused on the renewal and transformation of weaponry and equipment, the elevation of overall mobile defense capability not only in Asia-Pacific but around the world, and the increase of operational efficiency of the JSDF system.
At the same time, 2015 was also a year of “ground-breaking” significance for the development of the JSDF. The revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in April as well as the Diet’s approval of the new Security Bills in the second half of the year meant that the functional and operational scopes of the JSDF, in terms of legislation, had been expanded worldwide. Such breakthroughs would provide legal grounds and expansion space for improving the JSDF operation capabilities. Specific details include：
The new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation expanded the JSDF’s backup for the US forces by lifting the regional restriction of the “regions behind the battle front” which were peripheral or far away from the battle field, thus enabling the JSDF to engage in worldwide collaboration with the US forces. According to the new guidelines, the JSDF could provide the US forces with ammunition and supply fuel for the US fighters for takeoff. The U.S. and Japan also strengthened the coordination mechanism of the alliance, and negotiated about the establishment of a joint command office, which would contribute to the realization of the military integration （The “alliance coordination group” was set up in November, 2015, and the “Joint US-Japan Office” was planned to be established in 2017 as the joint operational command）.
The implementation of the new Security Bills in March, 2016 made the JSDF engagement in overseas operations more legitimate. This would propel the JSDF to speed up its improvement of operation capabilities, development of weapons and equipment, and proper augmentation of defense budget. After the approval of the new Security Bills, the new missions of the JSDF included sending armed units overseas to protect forces and civilians of other countries under attacks, escorting American warships, participating in warning and surveillance operations in South China Sea； providing forces of other countries with such supports as supplies, transportation and the like whenever and wherever possible； carrying out collective defense, etc.. As the above-mentioned new missions may evolve into armed conflicts under certain circumstances, the JSDF Joint Chief Department, as early as May of 2015, laid down the internal documents akin to “military operation plans”, aimed at establish the system of carrying out immediate military
operations at the stage of the approval and implementation of the new Security Bills. The documents not only addressed the measures the JSDF took to engage in “the East Sea” and “the South Sea” but recorded the “military-to-military coordination office” which the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and Security Bills even fail to mention. It is apparent that the JSDF has defined itself as a “force” in parallel with the U.S. force.
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